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Abstract 
In this paper, we address the impact of multilateral trade liberalisation (MTL) on the preferential 
tariffs granted by the EU, which is one of the largest traders and one of the biggest contributors 
to MTL. We empirically address two important questions. First, if the MFN tariff for a product is 
higher, does it lead to a higher or lower preferential tariff? Second, the EU being a large trading 
partner in such agreements, does reciprocity matter for giving meaningful preferential access? 
For a given MFN tariff, we model the preferential tariff with a simple linear functional form. We 
draw three important conclusions. First, the products that are highly protected do not get high 
preferential access even at the regional level. Second, reciprocity plays only a limited role in 
granting better preferential access. Third, GSP preferences matters when the EU negotiates with 
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1 Introduction   
The proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and the slow progress of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations (MTNs) have raised interest among scholars and policymakers in the 
question of how MFN and preferential tariffs are related. Bhagwati (1991) set out the basic 
question, whether lower preferential tariffs makes it harder or easier to lower MFN tariffs. More 
recently, Either (1998) and Freund (2000) have reversed the question and asked, whether lower 
MFN tariffs makes it easier to lower tariffs preferentially.  
This paper addresses this set of issues using data for the European Union (EU), one of the most 
prolific signatories of PTAs, but also a long-time participant in MFN tariff cutting.  The paper 
does not attempt to tackle the full set of issues, focusing rather on two specific questions – 
1) How does the level of the MFN tariffs set in 1994 in the context of the Uruguay Round, affect 
the level of preferential tariffs granted in subsequent PTAs?  
2) Does the degree of reciprocity in the EU’s post-UR PTAs affect the level of the EU’s 
preferential tariffs? 
The theory for preferential tariff formations is not tightly interlinked with the empirics, so based 
on careful reading of legal texts of the agreements and interviews with preferential trade 
negotiators, we developed an empirical model in which we control for variables that we can 
measure – e.g. MFN applied tariffs, reciprocity and GSP ; and control for the other factors like 
political economy, product specific rules of origin, transportation costs, exchange rate 
movements, growth in GDP of the partners etc., that could potentially affect the preferential 
tariffs with the fixed effects.  
To quantify reciprocity, we construct a variable that measures, for each good, at the six digit 
level, the reciprocal access provided to the EU by a preferential partner. We codify eleven PTA 
legal agreements to construct a unique data-set for preferential tariffs applied by partners for our 
study period 1995- 2007. Since we use a panel data on highly disaggregated HS six digit product 
level, we are able to estimate the coefficients of our interest without losing any interesting 
information for this study.   4 
To summarise the results, we find strong evidence that products that are highly protected at the 
MFN level get less preferential access to the EU. These products mainly are in the agriculture 
and fishery sectors. Another interesting finding is that the reciprocity matters to the EU but only 
to a limited extend. Additionally, we also find that when the EU negotiates with developed 
countries, the GSP preferences granted by the EU have an impact on preferential tariffs 
formation for the developed partners. But when it comes to negotiating the preferential tariffs 
with the developing countries, GSP does not seem to have a similar parallel impact.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows – Section 2 motivates the analysis and 
presents an overview of EU’s tariff structure. Section 3 presents the related Literature. Section 4 
discusses the econometric model and methodology. Section 5 discusses the data requirements 
and sources of data. Section 6 discusses the key econometric issues. Section 7 presents the 
empirical results on ‘testable’ hypothesis. It also presents evaluations of the empirical results 
based on our baseline model and confirms the robustness of results.  Section 8 concludes.  
2  The EU’s Tariff Structure  
2.1  MFN Tariff Structure 
The EU tariff nomenclature, known as the Combined Nomenclature, is based on the International 
Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System.  As per the EU’s 
Trade Policy Review, 2007 at the WTO, the EU’s purely MFN regime applies to only nine WTO 
Members
2, which account for some 36% of its merchandise trade
3.  The EU's Common Customs 
Tariff schedule for 2006, contains 9,843 lines at the eight digit level (5224 products at six digit 
HS 2002).  The EU has bound all its tariff lines at the WTO (Annex II).  The proportion of tariff 
lines with the same applied and bound rates is 98.4%.  It applies several types of tariff (Annex 
III); ad valorem rates are the most widely used (90%), followed by specific (6.4%), compound 
(2%), alternate (0.7%) and variable (0.9%). Some agricultural products are subject to tariff rate 
quotas. 
                                                            
2  These are: Australia; Canada; Chinese Taipei; Hong Kong, China; Japan; Republic of Korea; New  Zealand; 
Singapore; and the United States. 
3 The European Commission (Trade Policy Review, WTO 2007) estimates that 74% of the EU's trade is under the 
MFN regime; this implies that MFN trade with the EU’s preferential partners represents some 38% of its overall 
trade.  5 
The simple average applied MFN tariff is estimated at 6.9% in 2006 (up from 6.5% in 2004), 
with rates ranging from zero to 427.9% (Annex IV).  Some 81.5% of tariff lines have rates lower 
than 10% (Figure I). Agricultural products (WTO definition
4) are the most tariff-protected, with 
an average MFN tariff of 18.6% (more than twice the overall average MFN tariff).   
2.2 Tariff  preferences 
The EU has in place a wide variety of PTAs and arrangements motivated by economic, 
historical, development, and geo-political considerations (Annex I). As per the WTO’s 
preferential agreement database
5, the EU has notified 37 preferential agreements as of February, 
2009.  Typically, the preferences consist of duty-free access for most non-agricultural products, 
and lower tariffs (compared with the MFN levels), generally under tariff rate quotas on selected 
agricultural goods. These preferences vary country-wise, product-wise, and year-wise. Annex V 
provides information on EU’s preferential tariff averages in 2006.   
Baldwin and Wyplosz (2006)
6 characterise trade arrangements in Europe as hub-and-spoke 
bilateralism. The hub is formed by two concentric circles (the EU, which has the deepest level of 
integration, and EFTA which participates in the Single Market apart from agriculture). The EU’s 
preferential trade relationship can be divided into five major categories.  First, the Single Market 
via the European countries European Economic Area (EEA)
7 with Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway; and the “Bilateral Accords” with Switzerland.  Second, the Customs Union with Turkey 
(only for industrial products); Stabilisation and Association Agreements with five less-developed 
European countries Albania, Bosina and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia  and Montenegro. 
Third, Association Agreements with nine developing Mediterranean neighbours Algeria, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia. Fourth, PTAs with 
far away trading partners like Chile, Mexico and South Africa.  Fifth, non-reciprocal preferences 
extended to 76 African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries
8 under the Lomé Convention, 
                                                            
4 WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Annex I 
5 http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx 
6 For details, interested reader may refer Chapter 12, Baldwin and Wyplosz (2006), The Economics of European 
Integration (2nd edition).  
7 Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway (in 1994) ; Faroe Islands (in 1997), Switzerland (in 1972). 
8 Caribbean Forum of ACP States (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, the Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Christopher and 
Nevis, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago) ; Central Africa (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad , Congo, 6 
succeeded by the Cotonou Agreement
9 and non-reciprocal GSP preferences
10 to other developing 
countries. 
The EU's PTAs have so far resulted in free trade in industrial goods, and limited liberalization of 
trade in agricultural goods; in some cases, these agreements also cover trade in services. 
Liberalization under its reciprocal preferential agreements is often undertaken asymmetrically 
(with the EU liberalizing at a faster pace) and over different transition periods. The agreements 
also cover, inter alia, the harmonization of technical requirements (including standards), 
intellectual property protection, investment, competition policy, government procurement, trade 
defense instruments, and dispute settlement mechanism.  
3  Literature Review 
The literature on classic question about the PTAs being ‘stumbling or building’ blocks as framed 
by Bhagwati in 1991 is fairly well developed. The existing literature addresses this important 
question by studying how the preferential trade liberalization affects the MTL. Levy (1997), 
Grossman and Helpman (1995), Krishna (1998), Limao (2007) are examples of some influential 
papers on theoretical side. Baldwin and Seghezza (2008), Limao (2006) and Estevaldeordal, 
Freund and Ornelas (2008) are excellent examples of empirical papers.  Ethier (1998) and 
Freund (2000) address the reverse question by theoretically developing a model for the effect of 
MTL on the formation of PTAs. Fugazza and Nicoud (2008) empirically investigate the reverse 
question.  In the next sub-sections, we first discuss some of the theoretical papers, then we look 
at the empirical papers relevant for our study.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe) ; East South Africa (Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo , Djibouti,  Eritrea , Ethiopia , Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Madagascar, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, 
Sudan, Uganda , Zambia, Zimbabwe); Southern Africa (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Comoros, 
Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania); Pacific (Cook Islands, Federation of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, Niue,  Palau, Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu); West Africa 
(Benin, Burkina Faso, Republic of Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo). 
9 The Cotonou Agreement expired on 31 December 2007. Negotiations for full Economic Partnership Agreement 
with reciprocity are ongoing.  
10 In 1968, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) recommended the creation of a ‘Generalized 
System of Preferences’ (GSP) under which industrialized countries would grant trade preferences to all developing 
countries on a non-reciprocal basis. A key principle was (and is) the idea that such “special and differential 
treatment” be granted on the basis of “non-reciprocity”, reflecting the premise that “treating unequals equally simply 
exacerbated inequalities” (UNCTAD, 2004).  7 
3.1  Theoretical  Literature  
Levy (1997) argues that in the absence of the PTA, the median voter would accept the MTL.  But 
the voter may reject MTL in the event of a subsequent possibility of PTA, even though before 
the PTA the median voter would have agreed to the MTL. Grossman and Helpman (1995) show 
that trade diversion may occur in sectors in which the cost of production is higher (than the rest 
of the world) in the PTA member and for this reason the producers may lobby for the PTA. 
Krishna (1998) argues that when countries liberalise multilaterally, the export rents of the 
producers get depleted compared to the presence of a PTA that generates greater rents for such 
producers. Therefore, these producers have an incentive to lobby for PTA and this could reduce 
the incentive of the members of PTA for MTL.  Limao (2007) focuses on cooperation in non-
trade issues by small countries in PTAs with large countries. He argues that the PTAs create an 
incentive for large country to maintain higher MFN tariffs. The reason being, PTA is valuable to 
large because it allows it to extract cooperation from the small in non-trade issue by not eroding 
the preference of small country.  Therefore, PTAs—currently allowed by WTO rules—are a 
stumbling block to multilateral liberalization.  
On contrast addressing the reverse question, Ethier (1998) gives a model when the demand for 
final goods rises due to the MTL, and the rich country may source the production of intermediate 
goods to the developing countries. This encourages the formation of PTAs between rich country 
and the developing country. Freund (2000) explores how MTL affects the incentive of a country 
to join a PTA and the associated self-enforcement mechanism.  Using the oligopolistic model of 
trade, she finds that as the multilateral tariff level falls, the forces pulling countries away from 
free trade and into bilateral agreements get strengthen.   
3.2  Empirical Literature  
Estevaldeordal, Freund and Ornelas (2008) examine the effect of regionalism on unilateral trade 
liberalization using industry-level data on applied MFN tariffs and bilateral preferences for ten 
Latin American countries from 1990 to 2001. They suggest that concerns about a negative effect 
of preferential liberalization on external trade liberalization are unfounded and support the 
building block argument about PTAs. On the other hand, addressing the reverse question, 
Fugazza and Nicoud (2008) show that products for which the US agreed to cut its MFN tariffs 8 
substantially between the end of the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds of GATT negotiations (1979-
1994) are also the products for which subsequent tariff cuts on a preferential basis are boldest.   
The importance of MFN and preferential tariffs in PTAs and their relationship has been well 
developed in Baldwin and Seghezza (2008), and Limao (2006). The focus of these studies has 
been on estimating building or stumbling block effects of PTAs on MTL. These papers take the 
preferential tariffs as exogenous and access their impact on MTL by the members of PTA.  For 
example, Limao (2006) uses the following linear approximation
11 (equation E4 in his paper) to 
estimate the stumbling block effects of the US PTAs  
  ( ) 1,...., (1)
kk k k k
it i I iT t t iT jt jT i kk j Ga a s bb s w u i N                
where, the dependent variable  it    is a measure of the U.S. MFN bound ad-valorem tariff 
change during two consecutive multilateral negotiations. He uses detailed data on US tariff 
reductions during the most recent multilateral trade round to provide the systematic evidence that 
the US’s PTAs were a stumbling block to its multilateral liberalization. Limao deals with the 
endogenity of MTL and preferential trade liberalization in the above equation.  
Baldwin and Seghezza (2008), use the following model
12 (equation (1) in their paper)
  
0 (2) gpm gpm gm gm MFN PTA Dchapter v       
where MFNgpm and PTAgpm denote the MFN and preferential tariffs respectively, applied by 23 
countries indexed by g in the p
th PTA on product tariff line m. Using an impressive tariff line 
data-set at the most disaggregated level they find support for the building block argument.  In 
this paper, again one important issue is endogenity between MFNgpm and PTAgpm.  
                                                            
11 The dependent variable  it    is a measure of the U.S. MFN bound ad-valorem tariff change during two 
consecutive multilateral negotiations. in period  t= 1 (final stages of Tokyo Round, 1977-78) and t =2 (final stages 
of Uruguay Round, 1993-94) on the 8-digit product i. The indicator variable Gi  denotes whether the good is 
exported to the U.S. under a preferential agreement.   The coefficient   a  denotes an intercept that estimates the average 
MFN tariff change for the excluded industry (miscellaneous manufacturing); aI represents the set of included industry 
dummies.  The next two variables capture the  US bargaining power relative to country k  and a measure of product 
specific reciprocity, respectively.   
12 Where MFNgpm and PTAgpm denote the MFN and preferential tariffs respectively, applied by 23 countries indexed 
by g in the p
th PTA on m
th product tariff line. Dchaptergm are 14 dummies for the main HS chapter aggregations 
(animal, vegetables, foodstuffs, mineral products, chemicals, plastics, raw hides, skin and leather, wood, textile, 
footwear, stone and glass, metals, machinery and transportation equipment. The error term, vgm, may contain a 
common group effect, cg, that is vgm=cg+ugm.   9 
4  Theoretical Considerations   
4.1  Relation with the previous empirical papers  
Though we draw our motivation from Baldwin and Seghezza (2008), and Limao (2006) the 
present study addresses the reverse question, focusing on the formation of preferential tariffs 
applied by the EU, after its MTL program is known. So we can take the MFN tariff as exogenous 
to the preferential tariff. Given, that the EU’s MTL program was known to the world by the end 
of Uruguay Round in 1994, we estimate the impact of MTL on preferential tariff negotiations of 
the EU during the period 1995 to 2007. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study that has 
tried to explain empirically the formation of preferential tariffs, once MTL of a country is known 
to the world. 
Careful reading of legal PTA documents of the EU, reveal an important fact that has not been 
exploited by previous literature. In case of the EU, for most of the products, the bound rates and 
applied rates were the same during the period 1995 to 2007
13. The EU’s bound and hence the 
applied rates since 1995 were well known
14 to the world. The reductions in MFN tariffs in 
preferential agreements are generally based on base rate
15 (or current applied MFN rate) as 
agreed in the PTA documents.  This should help us to tackle endogenity issues in our empirical 
work. As the preferential tariffs seem to depend on the applied MFN tariffs and not the other way 
round, we argue absence of endogenity in Section 6.  Additionally, since the exchange of 
preferences is not on ‘one to one’ basis, we again rule out endogenity on account of reciprocity 
variable in Section 6.   
4.2 Econometric  Model   
Interviews with the EU trade negotiators reveal that when a country negotiates a PTA it takes 
into account three important factors. First, non-agricultural products are given more preferential 
access compared to the agriculture and fisheries products. This fact is also confirmed from tariff 
reduction schedules of the EU and Annex V. Second, for products that already get preferential 
                                                            
13 In 2006, 98.4 % products have the same applied rate as their bound rate. 
14 The EU has negotiated its bound rates at Uruguay Round in 1994 and agreed at the WTO to implement the current 
concessions by 2004.  For 77.74 % products on six digit HS 1996, EU implemented it bound rate commitments by 
2002.  By 2004, it implemented 100% of its bound rate commitments. 
15 For most of the EU’s PTAs, the base rate (or basic duty) has been defined in the text of the Agreements .This is 
equal to the applied rate in a particular year , generally in the year  immediately before the PTA. 10 
access under the non-reciprocal GSP program, the EU seems to be more liberal in allowing the 
preferential access to its PTA partners.  Third, in the case of reciprocal PTAs, the reciprocity in 
terms of market access matters to the EU.  Although, the EU liberalizes at a faster pace than the 
PTA partners over different years, still the reciprocity matters may be to a limited extent.  
Following, Anderson and Wincoop (2003) , we simplify the EU’s trade by aggregating all 
preferential partners of the EU into one region called ‘PRF region’ and all the partners trading on 
MFN basis as  ‘MFN region’. For a given MFN rate; we model the preferential tariff formation 
with a simple linear functional form similar to the one used in Baldwin and Seghezza (2008), and 
Limao (2007) :  
,1 ,1 ,, (3) zt zt zt zt PRF MFN      
where,  , zt PRF is simple average
16 of ad-valorem preferential tariffs applied by EU on import of 
product z at time t from the ‘PRF region’ at the six digit HS 1996. Similarly,  , zt MFN is simple 
average of MFN applied tariff by the EU on imports of product z from ‘MFN region’ at time t .  
, zt  are the other variables that may affect the EU’s decision to apply certain level of preferential 
tariffs on ‘PRF region’ products.   
Reciprocity and GSP are two other important economic variables that may have an effect on the 
EU negotiators’ decision about the level of preferential tariffs. In addition, we also want to test, 
if these two variables affect the preferential tariff formation, therefore, we include them 
specifically in our simple model (3) to arrive at the following equation: 
,1 ,1 , 1, ,, (4) zt zt zt zt zt zt PRF MFN Recp GSP         
This equation helps us to detangle the effects of reciprocity and GSP preferences.   , zt Recp  is 
defined in terms of the market access provided by all the partners to the EU, and therefore, if the 
EU negotiators follow reciprocity this would lead to lower preferential tariffs for the ‘PRF 
region’. Since the ‘PRF region’ consists of 199 countries, we need to aggregate market access 
offered by the partners. In preferential tariff negotiations, the negotiators focus on market access 
concessions provided by the partner country, rather than the simple difference in the MFN and 
                                                            
16 We could take the trade weighted average of the preferential averages, but it is not likely to change our estimation 
results. Moreover, we are likely to lose almost two third of the observations as most of the preferences are not used 
by the partners.   11 
preferential tariff.  Drawing our motivation from Limao (2008)
17 , we define market access or 
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zt zt zt mop MFN PRF  .  In equation (4), GSPz,t  is a dummy variable that equals 
one, if the product z gets GSP at time t, otherwise it is zero.  
The above equation still disregards other factors that help the EU negotiators to decide 
preferential tariffs, such as political economy considerations, i.e. some products may have higher 
tariffs historically, some products may have stricter rules of origin, or some products may have 
higher transportation costs etc.  The other time specific effects such as exchange rate movements 
affecting tariffs, growth in GDP, etc. are also not captured by equation (4) and are included in 
term  , zt   . We take advantage of our panel data structure, and include these effects as the fixed 
product and time effects.  This would help us, to estimate the equation without including specific 
variables and later dealing with the issues raised by these extra variables, such as endogenity, 
lack of sufficient and comparable product-wise, country-wise periodic data. At the same time, we 
are not particularly interested in estimating any of these components, so we will not lose any 
information, which is interesting for the present study. Writing the term  , zt   as  , zt z t DD   , 
we obtain the following:  
,1 ,1 , 1, , (5) zt zt zt zt z t zt PRF MFN Recp GSP D D         
Here,  z D  is the product fixed effect,  t D  is a time fixed effect and   , zt  is error term, which is 
assumed to be i.i.d .  
The main parameter of interest in equation (5) are  1   and  1  . If higher (lower) MFN applied 
tariffs lead to higher (lower) preferential tariffs, we would expect  1   to be positive and 
                                                            
17 Limao (2008) defines reciprocity in the context of multilateral negotiations  ()
kk k
tj t j T
j
ma w      12 
significant, but less than one.  In case, the EU values reciprocity, we would expect,  1   to be 
positive and significant. This would mean that more reciprocity by the ‘PRF region’ will lead to 
lower preferential tariffs. If the EU values non-reciprocal GSP preferences, then  1   should be 
significant and negative, implying that the products covered under GSP are given better 
preferential treatment.  
4.3 Extensions   
The model presented up to this point has not considered the two possibilities. First, the EU may 
impose higher preferential tariff on products having higher MFN tariff (e.g. in agriculture, 
fisheries and textiles sectors). Second, the EU may be giving better preferential access to the 
‘PRF region’ when it extends more reciprocal preferences for the EU’s exports.   








, 1zt i   Equal to one, if the MFN tariff on product z at time t is smaller than 
the cut-off value of 7.0%, otherwise it is equal to zero.  
, 2zt i   Equal to one if the MFN tariff on product z at time t is greater than 
the cut-off value of 7.0%, otherwise it is equal to zero.  
Recpz,t 
, 1zt ir   Equal to one, if the reciprocity that the EU gets on product z at time 
t is lower than the cut-off value of 4.06, otherwise it is equal to 
zero.  
, 2zt ir   Equal to one, if the reciprocity that the EU gets on product z at time 
t is higher than the cut-off value of 4.06, otherwise it is equal to 
zero. 
We interact the first two indicator variables with MFNz,t and the last two variables  with Recpz,t.  
Putting all these together, we estimate the following equation:
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   
 
                                                            
18  The choice of cut-off point is arbitrary. The reason for choosing 7.0% as cut-off for MFN variable is that the 75% 
of the products in our data-set have MFN tariff less than 7.0% and 99% of the products have tariff less than 44.86%. 
We could have chosen median of MFN variable as the cut-off , but this would not make any difference to our 
findings.  
19 The choice of cut-off point is again arbitrary. The reason for choosing 4.06 as cut-off is that the 75% of the 
observations have reciprocity value less than 4.06 and 99% of the observations have reciprocity variable less than 
8.16. We could have chosen median of reciprocity variable as the cut-off, but this would not make any difference to 
our findings.  13 
The equation (6) helps us to detangle the two effects in MFN and reciprocity variables.  If the 
EU applies lower preferential tariff (i.e. provides higher preferential access) on the products with 
lower MFN applied tariff, and the higher preferential tariff (i.e. provides lower preferential 
access) on the higher MFN applied tariff products, then we should expect  1    and  2  to be 
positive and significant, and 12    .  This would mean that the highly protected products do not 
get higher preferential access but on the other hand the lowly protected products at the MFN 
level get higher preferential access. The reason could be higher political economy forces in some 
sectors may force the EU government to continue providing higher protection, even in 
preferential agreements.  We should expect the sign of  1   to be positive and significant and  2   
to be insignificant. This would confirm that the EU values reciprocity by the ‘PRF region’ only 
up to a limited extent. The reciprocity beyond a limit does not really matter to get lower 
preferential tariffs to the EU market. The idea is simple to understand. For example, if on some 
product z , the EU is not ready to reduce more due to political economy forces (e.g. agricultural 
products) , then a higher reciprocity by the ‘PRF region’ in that product may not guarantee a 
lower preferential tariff . The expectation about the sign and significance of  1   remains the same 
as explained in case of equation (5).   
Similarly, we can divide the MFNz,t and  Recpz,t variables into four quartiles each and generate 








, 1zt i   Equal to one, if MFN tariff falls in the first quarter of MFN tariff 
applied by the EU on all products at time t, otherwise it is equal to 
zero.  
, 2zt i   Equal to one, if MFN tariff falls in the second quarter of MFN tariff 
applied by the EU on all products at time t, otherwise it is equal to 
zero. 
, 3zt i  
Equal to one, if MFN tariff falls in the third quarter of MFN tariff 




 The interacted MFN variables are denoted as MFN_i1, MFN_i2, MFN_i3 and MFN_i4 in regression results. The 
upper cut-off points for variables MFN_i1, MFN_i2 and MFN_i3 are 3.8%, 7.0%, 14.0% respectively. The tariff 
above 14.0% is captured by MFN_i4 .  
21 The interacted reciprocity variables are denoted as Recp_i1, Recp_i2 , Recp_i3 and Recp_i4 in regression results. 
The upper cut-off points for Recp_i1, Recp_i2, and Recp_i3 are 2.30, 4.06 and 8.16 respectively. The reciprocity 







, 4zt i  
Equal to one, if MFN tariff falls in the fourth quarter of MFN tariff 
applied by the EU on all products at time t, otherwise it is equal to 
zero. 
Recpz,t 
, 1zt ir   Equal to one, if reciprocity that the EU gets, falls in the first quarter of 
reciprocity extended on all products by ‘PRF region’ at time t, 
otherwise it is equal to zero.  
, 2zt ir   Equal to one, if reciprocity that the EU gets, 
 
falls in the second quarter 
of reciprocity extended on all products by ‘PRF region’ at time t , 
otherwise it is equal to zero. 
, 3zt ir  
Equal to one, if reciprocity that the EU gets, falls in the third quarter of 
reciprocity extended on all products by ‘PRF region’ at time t, 
otherwise it is equal to zero. 
, 4zt ir  
Equal to one, if reciprocity that the EU gets,
 
falls in the fourth quarter 
of reciprocity extended on all products by ‘PRF region’ at time t , 
otherwise it is equal to zero. 
We interact the first four variables with MFNz,t, to construct MFN_i1, MFN_i2, MFN_i3 and 
MFN_i4 .  This helps us to detangle the effects of higher MFN tariffs from lower MFN tariffs in 
four quartiles. Similarly, we interact the last four indicator variables with Recpz,t  to construct 
four quartiles of reciprocity Recp_i1, Recp_i2, Recp_i3 and Recp_i4 to detangle the effects of 
higher and lower reciprocity in our estimation. Finally, we will estimate the following:  
,, ,, , , , 1, , 2, ,
3, , 4, , 1 , , 2 ,,
3, , 4, , 1 , ,
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5  Data 
We focus on the period 1995 to 2007 i.e. 13 years after the WTO Agreement came into being. 
The number of PTAs grew at exceptional pace during this period. The PTAs notified to the WTO 
in 1994 were 91. By the end of 2007, there were more than 200 notified PTAs.  The EU notified 
17 PTAs during this period. In addition, the EU has announced two GSP programs. Moreover, 
this period is large enough to study the preferential liberalization program of the EU.  This also 
allows us to exploit the product-wise and year-wise variations in tariff preference. 
 
 15 
5.1 Data  Requirement 
Basically, we need two types of year-wise product-wise data -- data on tariffs, data on imports.  
For the EU, we need partner-wise preferential tariffs, MFN tariffs and the list of GSP products. 
For partners, we have to construct the reciprocity variable. So, we need the preferential tariffs 
applied on the EU products and MFN tariff. We also need partner’s import from the EU and rest 
of the world.  
5.2 Data  Sources 
As the countries have harmonized their tariff codes under the World Customs Organization 
(WCO), we use ‘Harmonized System’ or HS classification
22 of products for our study. The major 
source of data for this study is World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database 
and WTO’s Regional Trade Agreement Information System (RTA-IS)
23.  
5.2.1      The EU Related Data  
The EU’s preferential and MFN tariff data is electronically available for years 1995 to 2007 on 
different HS classifications
24 from TRAINS (Annex VI). We convert tariff data from different 
classifications to one common classification.  For most of the years the data is on HS 1996 
classification, so we choose HS 1996 as common classification to estimate our results.  
Next, we discuss how we convert the data into variables of our interest to estimate equations (5) 
and (6). The dependent variable in equation (5) and (6) is , zt PRF . We construct   , zt PRF  as the 
simple average of preferential tariffs applied by the EU on product z at time t.  The independent 
                                                            
22 Under the Harmonized Classification or HS, countries have to adopt common internationally accepted product 
classification. The first six digits of products classification are same for all the countries. Beyond six digits, 
countries are free to have further disaggregation of products as per their national requirements. Beyond six digits, 
there is no harmonization in the products and therefore, for cross country comparison of data, we need to restrict the 
product disaggregation in our study to HS six digits only. 
23 WITS provide access to three other important sources of data – TRAINS (by UNCTAD), COMTRADE (by 
UNSD) and IDB (by WTO).  WTO’s RTA-IS, provides access to the legal documents of all the PTAs. 
24 The EU’s partner-wise, product-wise preferential tariff data is electronically available for years 1995 on HS 
1988/1992 (H0), 1996 to 2001 on HS 1996 (H1), 2002 to 2006 on HS 2002 (H2) and 2007 on HS 2007 (H3) from 
TRAINS.  The EU’s product-wise MFN tariff data is also electronically available for the same years and on the 
same HS classification. Concordance tables are also available from WITS for converting one product classification 
to the other. We convert all the tariff data from HS 1988/1992, HS 2002 and HS 2007 classifications to HS 1996 
classification, as we run regressions on HS 1996 products.  16 
variables, we need to estimate equations (5) and (6) are , zt MFN ,  , zt Recp  , and GSPz,t.  Data on 
, zt MFN  and GSPz,t is taken directly from TRAINS.  , zt MFN  is the simple average of MFN 
applied tariff by the EU on product z at time t. GSPz,t is a dummy that is equal to one if the 
product z gets GSP benefit at time t.  In the next sub-section we discuss how we constructed 
, zt Recp  from our data-set. 
5.2.2      Partner Related Data--Constructing the measure of Reciprocity , () zt Recp  
The final variable we need, to estimate coefficients of interest in (5) and (6) is reciprocity. To 
construct this variable, we need year-wise, product-wise data on MFN applied tariff by the 
partner k i.e.  ,
k
zt MFN  . This data comes from TRAINS and IDB. The list of available data is 
attached at Annex VII
25. We take the simple average of partner k’s  year-wise product-wise 
applied MFN tariff on six digit products to construct  ,
k
zt MFN . 




zt PRF , applied by k
th 
partner on EU products. For three partners
26, the data is available from TRAINS and IDB. For 
other eleven countries
27 , we do not have sufficient data on preferential tariffs from TRAINS or 
IDB (Annex VII). Therefore, we calculate preferential tariff rates from careful reading of legal 
text of the PTA agreements and codifying the preferential tariff liberalization schedule of 
partners




zt PRF .   
To construct   
, kE U
zt s  = 
,,
,, /
kE U kT o t a l
zt zt MM  we need product-wise, year-wise data on imports by 








zt M . We 
get country-wise, year-wise and product-wise import data from COMTRADE , TRAINS and 
                                                            
25 Similar to the EU data, the data for partners’ MFN and preferential tariff is available under different HS 
classification for different years. Before we run our regressions, we use concordance tables from WITS to convert 
the data from different HS classifications to HS 1996 six digit classification.  
26 South Africa, Switzerland and Turkey. 
27 Albania, Algeria, Chile, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco and Tunisia. 
28 Refer WTO Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS) for legal text of PTA Agreements. 
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx 17 
IDB (Annex VII) . MFN imports data, for 12 PTA partners
29, is available on HS 1996 from 
COMTRADE.  MFN import data is also available from TRAINS and IDB for nine partners
30. 
We complete MFN import data using both these sources. Preferential imports from the EU by 12 
PTA partners
31, is available from COMTRADE; for four partners
32 the data is available from 
TRAINS or IDB.  However, we do not have any data for preferential imports for eight partners
33 
form either source. Using, COMTRADE we take exports from the EU to partners to get an 
approximation of imports from the EU by these partners. But since the COMTRADE’s exports 
data is on FOB (free on board) basis and imports data is on CIF (Cost insurance and freight) 
basis, we have to make adjustments for this difference








zt M , it 
is simple to construct 
, kE U
zt s . Using the data on 
, kE U
zt s ,  ,
k




zt PRF we can construct the 
reciprocity offered by  partner k i.e.  
,,
,, *
kE U kE U
zt zt mop s  .  It is now straightforward to construct 
the reciprocity variable of our interest i.e.  , zt Recp  for the ‘PRF region’. 
6  Key Econometric Issues   
6.1  Endogenity - MFN and preferential tariffs 
Literature suggests, that we should be cautious in interpreting the OLS and FE estimates from 
equation (5) and (6) as causal because causality may also run from preferential tariffs to MFN 
tariffs; this may be due to the fact that the preferential rates are decided on the basis of the MFN 
tariffs. So, there may be a reverse causality from the EU’s preferential tariffs to the EU’s MFN 
tariffs. In the particular setting for the EU, we argue in the next two paragraphs absence of 
endogenity on account of MFN variable.  
                                                            
29 Albania (1996-2007), Algeria (1996-2007), Chile (1997-2007), Croatia (1997-2007), Israel (1996-2006), Jordan 
(1998-2007), Lebanon (1997-2007), Mexico (1996-2007), Morocco (2002-2007), South Africa (1997-2006), Tunisia 
(2000-2007) and Turkey (1996-2006).  
30 Chile (1995, 1996), Egypt (1995, 1997-2005 and 2007), Israel (2007), Mexico (1995), Morocco (1997, 2001), 
South Africa (1996, 2007), Switzerland (1996-2007), Tunisia (1995, 1998) and Turkey (1995, 2007). 
31 Albania (1996-2007), Algeria (1996-2007), Chile (1997-2007), Croatia (1997-2007), Israel (1996-2006), 
Jordan(1998-2007), Lebanon (1997-2005, 2007), Mexico (1996-2007), Morocco (2002-2007), South Africa (1997-
2007), Tunisia (2000-2007) and Turkey (1996-2006). 
32 Egypt (2005), Israel (2007), Switzerland (1996-2007), and Turkey (2007). 
33 Egypt (1995-2004, 2006, 2007), Jordan (1995-1997), Lebanon (1995, 1996), Morocco (1995-2001), South Africa 
(1995, 1996), Switzerland (1995), Tunisia (1995-1999) and Turkey (1995).  
34 As per WITS, the FOB figures are approximately 5% to 10 % lower than the corresponding CIF figures. We take 
a factor of 6% to convert FOB values to CIF values. 18 
The bound rates commitments of the EU were known by the end of the Uruguay Round (1994)
 to 
all the member of the WTO. In addition, the EU’s applied tariffs on most of the products (98.4% 
products) are equal to its bound tariffs. Therefore, the EU’s applied MFN rates were known to 
the world by the end of 1994. As agreed in the tariff reduction schedule with the partners, the 
reduction on import tariffs is based on current applied rates (or base rate)
35 . For example, in EU- 
Morocco Agreement, the EU has agreed not to impose any tariffs on industrial products 
originating in Morocco from the date of implementation of the agreement (01.03.2000). For 
Agricultural and Fishery products, the EU has agreed to apply the tariff reduction schedule given 
in Protocol 1 and 2 respectively. Protocol 1 gives the reduced tariffs on Moroccan agricultural 
products as x% of applied MFN tariff of EU with tariff rate quota restrictions. Similarly, the 
reduction in tariffs in fishery products is again based MFN applied tariffs.  
As the EU’s bound rate commitments, hence applied MFN rates were known before the PTA 
was signed, it is clear that the MFN applied rates affect the EU’s preferential tariff rates, but the 
reverse is not true. Therefore, we argue that there is no reverse causality from preferential tariffs 
to MFN tariffs in our estimation equations (5) and (6).  
6.2  Endogenity - Reciprocity variable and preferential tariffs 
Literature, suggests that second cause of reverse causality could be that the preferential tariffs (
, zt PRF ) may affect the reciprocity variable , (e ) zt R sp . To better understand the endogenity issue, 
let us refer to the standard text book
36 example of following equation: 
1, 2, 1 1, 2 '' ( 7 ) it it it it yy x u    
1,it y is a scalar dependent variable, which depends on m endogenous regressors, denoted by  2 y
and  1 K exogenous regressors (including an intercept) denoted by  1 x , with  1,......., iN  and
1,.... tT  .  If, the regression errors  it u are uncorrelated with  1,it x but are correlated with 2,it y , then 
OLS/FE estimators are inconsistent for   and there is a problem of endogenity. In that case, we 
have to tackle endogenity with proper instruments using instrument variables (IV) regression. 
                                                            
35 For most of the EU’s PTAs, the base rate (or basic duty) has been defined in the text of Agreements. This is equal 
to the applied rate in a particular year, generally in the year immediately before the PTA. 
36 Refer Microeconometrics by Cameron and Trivedi (2005) or any other standard text book on econometrics.  19 
But if the error term  it u are uncorrelated with the regressors  2,it y  and  1,it x , we can estimate the 
equation (6) using the OLS or FE methods without using the instruments.  If the regressors  2,it y
are exogenous and we treat them as endogenous, then the IV estimate is still consistent, but they 
can be much less efficient than the OLS or FE estimators.  We argue in the following paragraphs 
the absence of reverse causality in our model.  
A careful comparison of preferences extended by the EU and the reciprocal market access, 
shows that the exchange of concessions by the EU with its partners is not on ‘one-to-one’ basis. 
The PTAs are agreed as a package, in which there are not only agreements on tariff elimination 
on goods, but commitments by both the partners in the other areas
37 as well.  Even if, we restrict 
ourselves to the goods commitment schedule, we find that the EU being larger partner has agreed 
to zero import duties on industrial goods
38 w.e.f. from the date of implementation of the PTA, 
with the expectation from the other partners to reduce its tariffs in a yearly phased manner. For 
example, in all seven EU-Mediterranean Agreements
39 and two Stabilization and Association 
Agreements
40, the EU reduces its applied tariff to zero on all industrial goods from the date of 
implementation of PTA. The smaller partners are expected to reduce their import duties for EU 
products in a phased manner, sometimes extended upto 10 years. This kind asymmetrical 
liberalization is referred as ‘less than full reciprocity’ in negotiating parlance. Such asymmetrical 
liberalization is common in PTA involving a large and a smaller economy.   
On the other hand, the agriculture and fisheries products
41, which are highly protected in most of 
the countries, there is limited liberalization of trade from both sides. But the principal of ‘less 
                                                            
37 In particular, there are commitments from both the PTA partners on rules of origin, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, commitments on services, financial services, commitments on government procurement, agreements on 
current payments and capital movement.  
38 Industrial goods are defined as products of HS chapters 25-97 not covered by definition of agricultural products.  
39 The nine partners are-- Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria and 
Tunisia.  But due to data constraints on Palestinian Authority and Syria, we include only other seven agreements in 
the present study.  
40 EU’s Stabilization and Association Agreements are with Macedonia, Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, Bosina and 
Herzegovina. As the last two agreements are very recent (both finalized in 2008), we do not include them in the 
present study. Due to data constraints on Macedonia also, we leave it from the scope of present study.  
41 Agricultural and fisheries products are defined as products listed in chapters 1 to 24 of HS code, with the addition 
of any product listed in Annex I to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. This definition also includes fish and 
fisheries products covered by chapter 3, headings 1604 and 1605, and sub-headings 051191, 230120 and ex 190220. 
There is a slight difference in the definition of Agricultural Goods in EU’s agreements compared to the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture. The EU’s definition, in general, has fisheries products under the Agricultural products, 
whereas at WTO negotiations, fisheries are part of non-agricultural products.  20 
than full reciprocity’ is still observed with the EU liberalizing its tariffs at a faster pace than the 
partners. Nonetheless, the exchange of preferences is again complementary and not ‘one-to-one’ 
product-basis. In other words, the EU exchanges preferences for the products that it can export to 
the partners. Similarly, the partners are interested in getting preferential treatment on the 
products that they can export to the EU i.e. the exchange of preferences is not ‘apples with 
apples’, but ‘apples with oranges’.  
For example, under EU- Morocco Agreement, the EU gets preferential access in Morocco’s 
market for Chapter 1 products ‘0102 10 : Live bovine animals; pure-breeding animals and 0105 
11: Live fowls of the species Gallus domesticus, of a weight not exceeding 185g’ , but Morocco 
does not get preference in the EU market on the same products. Instead, Morocco gets preference 
in ‘0101 19 10: Horses for slaughter, 0101 19 90: Other horses’. Similar exchange of preferences 
is observed in other PTAs as well. Moreover, since we are aggregating all the preferential 
partners into one ‘PRF region’, the scope for endogenity gets further diluted.  
In brief, we conclude that there is no problem of endogenity on account  , zt PRF  variable vis-à-vis 
either  , zt MFN  or  , e zt R sp variable and we can estimate equations (5) and (6) using OLS and FE 
estimation methods.  
7 Empirical  Results 
7.1 Estimation  Results 
The results of estimating equations (5), (6) and (7) are reported in Table 1
42. Each entry of the 
table reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors clustered at the product level. The 
column 1 estimates equation (5) using pooled OLS. The column 2 estimates equation (5) using 
FE model; while column 3 estimates equation (6). In column 4 to 7, we control for four quarters 
of MFN tariff and reciprocity variable as well as the GSP variable.  In subsequent paragraphs, we 
discuss the results of column 1 to 7.  
                                                            
42 In column 1 and 2, MFN_i1 denotes the MFN variable.  In column 3 dependent variables MFN_i1 and MFN_i2 
denotes MFN tariffs below and above 7.0% , respectively . Recp_i1 denote reciprocity variable in column 1 and 2 . 
In column 3 and 6, the dependent variables Recp_i1, Recp_i2 denote reciprocity below and above the cut-off level of  
4.06.  Similarly, MFN_i1, MFN_i2, MFN_i3 and MFN_i4 denote the four quarters of MFN tariff in column 4  to  7 
and Recp_i1, Recp_i2, Recp_i3 and Recp_i4 denote the four quarters of reciprocity variable in column 7.  21 
In column 1 specification, the data is available for 66,547 year-product observations. The 
number of dependent variables is 15 as we also control for time dummies for 12 years. However, 
because of missing observations the number of observations used in the regression is 65,023. The 
estimated coefficient for the MFN tariff is positive (less than one) and significant, a result that 
supports the hypothesis that lower (higher) MFN tariffs would lead to lower (higher) preferential 
tariffs. The reciprocity coefficient is negative and significant, which does not seem to support our 
hypothesis. The estimated coefficient for GSP variable is negative and significant, supporting 
that the EU values non-reciprocal preferences while deciding preferential tariffs. The consistency 
of OLS
43 requires that the composite error term is uncorrelated with the dependent variables, but 
it ignores any heterogeneity over products. For our data set, it is highly unlikely that the product 
specific effects  z D  are uncorrelated with the     ,   and      ,  or     ,  variables. Therefore, 
pooled OLS is inconsistent in the fixed effects model and we re-estimate (5), (6) and (7) using 
the FE model in column 2 to 7.   
In column 2, we estimate model (5) taking advantage of panel structure of our dataset.  The data 
is available for 5119 products for 13 years (1995 to 2007), but due to missing observations, the 
number of observations used is 65,023. The number of dependent variables is 15, as we also 
control for the time dummies for 12 years.  According to these estimates, the coefficient for 
MFN tariff is positive (0.037), but insignificant. The estimated coefficient of reciprocity is also 
insignificant, although negative. However, the GSP coefficient is significant and negative 
implying that GSP matters for the EU in deciding the preferential tariffs.  The reason for 
coefficient of MFN variable being insignificant is that the EU protects the products with higher 
MFN tariffs in PTAs too. The insignificant preferential access on products with higher MFN 
tariffs biases our estimates. This will become clearer in subsequent estimations, when we 
segregate the MFN variable into more than one segment. We shall also observe that the higher 
reciprocity does not matter for preferential tariffs. The present estimates get downward bias due 
                                                            
43 The pooled OLS estimator are motivated from the individual-effects model by rewriting equation (5) as the pooled 
model   ,        , 
′               ,   . Any time-specific effects are assumed to be fixed and already included 
as time dummies in the regressors   , 
′ . The model explicitly includes a common intercept, and the individual effects 
         are now centered on zero. Consistency of OLS requires that the error term           ,   be 
uncorrelated with   , 
′ . So the pooled OLS is inconsistent in FE model, as    is correlated with   , 
′  (refer p703, 
Microeconometrics by Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for details). 22 
the higher reciprocity offered on certain products. These effects get isolated, only when we 
control for lower and higher reciprocity in columns 3 to 7.  
In column 3, both the MFN coefficients are insignificant, while the coefficient for the lower 
MFN tariff (MFN_i1) is negative, the coefficient for the higher MFN tariff (MFN_i2) is positive. 
This seems to imply that the MFN tariff does not matter in formation of preferential tariff, which 
however is not the case. Both the coefficients of reciprocity are insignificant, as was in case of 
the MFN variable. We shall observe in subsequent columns that the EU’s response to the MFN 
tariff and the reciprocity are different in different quarter of values. The coefficient for GSP 
variable is -1.001 and is highly significant, which implies that if a product gets GSP, then its 
tariff is lesser by 1.001 percent point as compared to the product that does not get GSP benefit. 
This supports our initial hypothesis that GSP matters in deciding preferential tariffs. The idea is 
simple to understand. The GSP preferences are non-reciprocal by definition and the tariffs on 
GSP products are either zero or very close to zero. Since, the EU has already lowered its tariffs 
on GSP products for many developing countries; it can easily reduce tariffs on the same products 
without incurring any additional costs.  
The coefficients in column 4 to 7 provide consistent estimates of coefficients of interest and are 
similar in sign and significance. The final estimates in Table1 control for all possible quarters of 
MFNz,t and Recpz,t variables, so in the next paragraph we discuss in detail the results of column 7.  
The estimated coefficient for MFN_i1 is negative and highly significant, whereas the coefficients 
for MFN_i2 and MFN_i3 are positive and significant, but coefficient for MFN_i4 is insignificant 
which is along the expected lines of our initial hypothesis.  To understand the implications, let us 
consider the upper cut-off for the first three quarters. The upper cut-off values for variables 
MFN_i1, MFN_i2  and MFN_i3 are 3.8%, 7.0%  and 14.0% respectively. A coefficient of -0.117 
for MFN_i1 implies that for products with MFN tariff less than 3.8%, keeping other variables 
constant, if the MFN tariff is increased by one percent point; the EU reduces preferential tariffs 
by 0.117 percent point. Coefficient of 0.087 for MFN_i2, implies that for products with MFN 
tariff between 3.8% to 7.0%, the EU increases preferential tariff by 0.087 percent point for one 
percent point increase in MFN tariff.  Similarly, the coefficient of  0.273 for MFN_i3 implies 
that for MFN tariffs between 7.0% and 14.0%, the EU increases preferential tariff by 0.273 23 
percent point for one percent point increase in MFN tariffs.  But when the MFN tariffs are higher 
than 14.0% (for MFN_i4), the increase in preferential tariff is not significant. We also notice an 
increasing trend
44 in coefficients for MFN variables as the tariff gets higher in first three 
quarters. In nutshell, we note that the products with a higher preferential tariff are the products 
with a higher MFN tariff.  
The estimated coefficients for Recp_i1, Recp_i2 and Recp_i4 are insignificant, whereas the 
coefficient for Recp_i3  is highly significant. The upper cut-offs for Recp_i1, Recp_i2, and 
Recp_i3 are 2.30, 4.06 and 8.16 respectively. The reciprocity in the first two quarters does not 
seem to influence the preferential tariff, but when the ‘PRF region’ shows somewhat higher 
reciprocity and its value is in the third quarter, a one percent increase in reciprocity will lead to 
reduction in preferential tariff by 0.131 percent. However, when excessive reciprocity (higher 
than 8.16) is shown, it does not seem to correspondingly affect the preferential tariffs. This 
supports our initial hypothesis that reciprocity matters, but not beyond a limit. The logic is 
simple to understand. For example, if the EU applies zero preferential tariffs on some industrial 
products, but reduction on agricultural tariffs is limited. Further, the access to the EU market is 
limited by tariff rate quota in most of the agricultural products. A higher reciprocal market 
access
45 by the ‘PRF region’ in agricultural products may not lead to lower preferential tariff to 
the EU market.  
The estimated coefficient for GSP variable again supports the initial hypothesis that GSP matters 
in preferential tariff formation.  
7.2  Extensions and Additional Results 
To corroborate the results presented in the previous sub-section, we do additional tests to see if 
the EU allows more preferential access for industrial products than for the agricultural 
products
46,47,48. In Table 2 regressions, we control for four quarters of MFN tariff on both the 
                                                            
44 In column 7, the coefficient for MFN_i1 is lower than coefficients for MFN_i2 and MFN_i3; coefficient for 
MFN_i2 is lower than coefficient for MFN_i3 but higher than the coefficient for MFN_i1; coefficient for MFN_i3 is 
the highest among MFN_i1, MFN_i2 and MFN_i3. The coefficient for MFN_i4 is insignificant.  
45 For example, the EU protects ‘060310: cut flowers’ for its domestic producers. It does not mean that higher 
preferential access by Tunisia to EU in Tunisian cut flower market will be lead to higher preferential access by the 
EU to Tunisia in the EU’s cut flower market.  
46 The EU’s average applied tariff on industrial products is 4.0% and on agricultural products is 18.6%. 24 
agricultural and the industrial products. For doing this we construct eight indicator variables, 
four each for agricultural and industrial products. The technique of creating the indicator 
variables is the same as in the previous sub-section; the only difference is that here we take 
separate
49quarters for agricultural and industrial products.  
The result of regressing the dependent variable PRFz,t  on four quarters of MFN tariff each for 
agricultural and industrial products are given in column 1 of Table 2. In next three columns, we 
also control for other determinants of preferential tariff. The other dependent variables we 
include are reciprocity and GSP. We get consistent estimates in all our regressions. Since, 
column 4 includes all variables of our interest; we discuss here only those results.   
The coefficient for the first quarter of agricultural sector (MFN_af_i1) is insignificant although 
positive implying that keeping other variables constant for products with MFN tariff in the range 
0% to 7.9%; the preferential tariff remains constant at 3.82%. For the second and third quarters 
(MFN_af_i2, MFN_af_i3), the coefficients are positive and highly significant. In the second 
quarter (i.e. 7.9%-15.16%), as the MFN tariff increases by one percent point, the preferential 
tariff increases by 0.247 percent point. In the third quarter (i.e. 15.16%-58.64%), the one percent 
point increase in MFN tariff leads to 0.241 percent point increase. However, the coefficient for 
the fourth quarter (MFN_af_i4), is insignificant
50, implying that for MFN tariff above 58.64%, 
the preferential tariff remains constant at 35.65%,  which is not sufficiently lower to give a 
meaningful preferential access. In short, we observe different response of the EU in four quarters 
of agriculture sector. This confirms that as the MFN tariff increases, the preferential tariff also 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
47 Industrial products are defined as those listed in Chapter 25 to 97 with the exception of the products listed in 
Annex I, § 1 (ii) of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.  
48 refer footnote 42. 
49 We divide the year-wise MFN tariff on agricultural products into four quarters (0%-7.9%, 7.9%-15.16%, 15.16%-
58.64% and above 58.64%; the upper limits are included in the four ranges) , to generate four indicator variables 
  _ 1 , ,  _ 2  , ,  _ 3  , ,      _ 4  ,  . The indicator variable   _ 1 ,  is equal to one, if     ,  falls in the first 
quarter of MFN tariffs on agriculture sector in year t, otherwise   _ 1 ,  is zero. The indicator variable   _ 2 ,  is 
equal to one, if     ,  falls in the second quarter of MFN applied tariffs on agricultural sector in year t, otherwise 
  _ 2 ,  is equal to zero. The other two indicator variables are defined accordingly. We interact these variables with 
    ,  to construct MFN_af_i1, MFN_af_i2, MFN_af_i3 and MFN_af_i4 .  Similarly, we construct MFN_na_i1, 
MFN_na_i2, MFN_na_i3 and MFN_na_i4 for the industrial sector. The four quarters for industrial tariffs are : 0%-
3.7%, 3.7%-6.5%, 6.5%-12.0% and above 12.0%, upper limit in each quarter is again included in four ranges. 
50 The coefficient for af_i4 is 31.27 and is highly significant. The common constant term is 4.38. So the constant 
term for the fourth quarter MFN_af_i4  is 35.65.  25 
increases and for the highly protected agricultural products, there is almost no preferential 
treatment. 
On the other hand, we notice a slightly different trend for industrial products. The coefficient for 
the first quarter is -0.234 and highly significant, implying that in the tariff range 0% to 3.7%, as 
the MFN tariff becomes higher the EU reduces its preferential tariff. For the second (i.e. 3.7% - 
6.5%) and the third quarter (i.e. 6.5% -12%), both the coefficients are insignificant, implying that 
the preferential tariff remains constant
51,52 at 2.66% and 2.51% respectively. For the fourth 
quarter, the coefficient is 0.101 and it is highly significant, implying that when the MFN tariff is 
above 12%, a one percent point increase causes an increase of 0.1% in preferential tariffs. In 
other words, the preferential tariff increases as the MFN tariff increases in this quarter.  
The estimated coefficients for Recp_i1, Recp_i2 and Recp_i4 are insignificant, whereas the 
coefficient for Recp_i3 is highly significant. This proves that reciprocity may not matter initially, 
but that it matters only up to a limited level. The extreme reciprocity shown does not seem to 
have any impact on preferential tariff formation. Again, the coefficient for GSP variable is 
negative and highly significant, implying that GSP matters, when the EU decides about the level 
of preferential tariffs.  
Overall, we conclude from Table 2 that the EU gives better preferential access on products with 
lower MFN tariffs, which are mainly in industrial sector. The reciprocity shown by partner 
matters but not beyond a limit. In case a product is covered under the GSP, its preferential tariff 
is smaller compared to a similar product that does not get GSP benefit. In other words, the results 
support our two initial hypotheses -- first, the high MFN tariff products do not get better 
preferential treatment, even at the preferential level; second, the reciprocity matters, but not 




51 The constant term for column 4 is 3.83, and the coefficient for na_i2 is -1.26. Both these coefficients are highly 
significant.  
52 The constant term for column 4 is 3.83, and the coefficient for na_i3 is -1.37. Both these coefficients are highly 
significant. 26 
7.3 Sensitivity  Analysis 
We now test the sensitivity of our estimates and do additional robustness tests. We consider an 
alternative sample of data. We re-estimate equations (5), (6) and (7) using data only for the EU’s 
developing partners. The time period for this data-set is 1998 to 2007
53  and the results are 
reported in Table 3 and 4. In the following paragraphs, we compare these results with the 
estimates in Table 1 and 2, respectively.  
First, we compare the final column estimates in Table 3 with corresponding estimates in Table 1. 
The coefficients for the first three quarters of MFN tariff have the similar sign and significance 
as in earlier estimates. Unlike Table 1, now the coefficient for the fourth quarter (MFN_i4) is 
significant but negative. This implies that for the developing partners, the EU is ready to reduce 
the MFN tariffs even on the highly protected products (i.e. MFN above 13.2%). Since the tariffs 
are already high in the fourth quarter, the notional cuts may not create market access for 
developing partners. Therefore, the market access for products with higher MFN tariffs remains 
elusive, confirming our initial hypothesis that the highly protected products do not get higher 
preferential access. With regard to the reciprocity variable, though the signs of four quarters are 
not the same in both the tables, yet the overall interpretation remain the same. In Table 3, the last 
quarter coefficient changes sign, implying thereby that the extreme reciprocity does not help in 
preferential tariff reduction. Another interesting difference from Table 1 is that the coefficient of 
GSP is insignificant. This can be explained easily as all the developing partners are already 
beneficiary of the GSP program.  
Finally, we corroborate the results of Table 2 from Table 4 for developing country. Like Table 2, 
here also, we control for four quarters
54 of MFN tariff on agricultural and industrial products 
                                                            
53 EU signed first PTA with any developing country in 1998 i.e. with Tunisia. Then EU signed PTAs with Israel 
(2000), Mexico (2000), Morocco (2000) , South Africa (2000), Jordan (2002), Chile (2003), Lebanon (2003), Egypt 
(2004), Algeria (2005), Croatia (2005) and Albania (2006). For our study we consider Turkey (1995), which is 
having Customs Union with the EU only in industrial products, as developed country. The other developed countries 
having PTA with the EU are Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Therefore, we drop Turkey, Norway, Iceland and 
Switzerland to construct our sample of developing countries for sensitivity analysis in this sub-section.  Recall, in 
Table1 the time period is 1995-2007. 
54 We divide the year-wise MFN tariff on agricultural products into four quarters (0%-7.57%, 7.57%-14.44%, 
14.44%-52.95% and above 52.95%; the upper limits are included in the four ranges). Four indicator variables are 
defined accordingly. We interact these variables with     ,  to construct MFN_af_i1, MFN_af_i2, MFN_af_i3 and 
MFN_af_i4 .  Similarly, we construct MFN_na_i1, MFN_na_i2, MFN_na_i3 and MFN_na_i4 for the industrial 27 
separately. Again we compare final columns of two tables, since it contains all the coefficients of 
our interest. For agricultural sector, the first quarter coefficient is highly significant and positive, 
showing that the preferential tariff increases with the MFN tariff. The next two quarters 
coefficients are insignificant showing that MFN tariff does not matter in this range while 
deciding the level of preferential tariff. In the last quarter one percent point increase in MFN 
tariff results in reduction in preferential tariff by 0.019%. Since, the tariffs are already very high 
in this quarter; a slight decrease does not make any difference so far as the partners’ market 
access is concerned. For industrial products, the preferential tariff increases with the MFN tariff 
in the second and third quarters. However, for first and fourth quarters, the coefficients are 
negative although significant. In the first quarter the MFN tariffs are already less than 3%, so any 
reduction as the MFN tariff increases does not make much difference. Similarly, in the case of 
MFN tariff higher than 12 %, the decrease in preferential tariff of industrial products does not 
give real market access to the developing partner. Overall, we conclude that the higher MFN 
products do not get high preferential treatment in the EU market. This conclusion is again similar 
to the corresponding results in Table 2. So far as the reciprocity variable is concerned, the second 
and fourth quarter coefficients are significant. The coefficient for the second quarter is positive 
while the coefficient for the fourth quarter is negative; again showing that the reciprocity matters 
up to a certain level but the extreme reciprocity do not matter in getting better preferential 
access. The coefficient for GSP variable is insignificant as is the case in Table 3, confirming our 
finding that when the EU negotiates with developing countries, it does not take into account 
whether the product gets GSP or not.  
8 Conclusion 
We have tried to empirically address two important questions on EU’s preferential tariff 
formation. First, does the EU liberalise more in preferential agreements on the products on which 
it has lower MFN tariff. In other words, does the EU protect more from its preferential partners 
the products that it protects at the MFN level?  Second, whether reciprocity matters for the EU in 
deciding preferential tariff, and if the answer to this question is yes, to what extent?   
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
sector.  The four quarters for industrial tariffs are : 0%-3.13%, 3.13%-6.2%, 6.2%-12.0% and above 12.0%, upper 
limit in each quarter is again included in four ranges. 28 
We have shown that the EU’s preferential tariff depends significantly on three quantifiable 
variables – MFN applied tariff, reciprocity shown by the partners, and the GSP program.  We 
draw three important conclusions from our results. First, the products that are less protected at 
the MFN level get better preferential access to the EU market; and highly protected products in 
agricultural, fisheries or textiles products do not get high preferential access. For most protected 
products the preference is almost close to zero, i.e. there is no reduction in high MFN tariffs in 
the PTAs. Second, the reciprocity matters in getting better preferential access, but it can play 
only a limited role. The higher reciprocity does not always imply a better preferential treatment 
by the EU.  Third, non-reciprocal preferences extended under the GSP scheme matter when the 
EU decides preferential tariffs for the developed partners, but it does not matter when the EU 
negotiates with developing partners.   
For this study, we have constructed a rich data-set using WITS and careful reading of legal 
documents of the EU’s eleven preferential agreements. The data that we have constructed from 
the PTAs’ legal documents is unique as even the international organizations (WTO, UNCTAD or 
ITC) do not have such a data-set at the time of writing this paper.  In addition, to our knowledge, 
there is no such study that looks into the preferential tariff formation of the EU, which is the 
biggest traders and have the highest number of PTAs in the world.  
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Table 1 
The Determinants of the EU’s Preferential Tariff 
 














  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PRF#  OLS  FE FE FE FE FE FE 
MFN_i1 0.084





  (0.022) (0.027) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
         




      (0.027) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) 
         





      (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.044)  (0.045) 
           
MFN_i4      0.036  0.036  0.033  0.033 
       (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
             
Recp_i1 -0.062
* -0.009  0.000      -0.014  0.052 
  (0.026) (0.012) (0.034)      (0.034) (0.062) 
         
Recp_i2     -0.010    -0.009  -0.026 
     (0.013)    (0.013)  (0.040) 
         
Recp_i3         0.131
*** 
         (0.037) 
           
Recp_i4         -0.011 
         (0.014) 








  (0.137) (0.108) (0.107)    (0.108) (0.107) (0.106) 









  (0.419) (0.400) (0.366) (0.314) (0.391) (0.393) (0.402) 
N  65023 65023 65023 65148 65148 65023 65023 
n    5102 5102 5102 5102 5102 5102 
k  15 15 19 19 20 23 27 
Product 
FE 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period  1995 to 2007  1995 to 2007  1995 to 2007  1995 to 2007  1995 to 2007  1995 to 2007  1995 to 2007 
F (k, N-n-k)  194.871 194.926 158.051 181.899 165.528 147.467 128.349 
rho    0.214 0.211 0.171 0.169 0.187 0.187 
r2_a  0.119        
r2_w    0.046 0.046 0.049 0.054 0.053 0.053 
Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the product level. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
N= number of observations, n= number of groups, k= number of dependent variables. 
Note: 
i)  # PRF (the dependent variable , zt PRF ): Simple average of preferential tariffs applied by the EU on all of its 
partners trading on preferential basis at six digit HS 1996 product z at time t.   
ii)  The dependent variable (PRF) is regressed on  
(a)  MFN: Simple average of MFN applied tariff by the EU on product z at time t on six digit HS 1996 
classification.  MFN_i1 to MFN_i4 are year-wise quartiles of MFN tariffs.  In case of regressions 
only with MFN, MFN_i1 denotes MFN variable. Similarly, in case of regressions with MFN_i1 32 
and MFN_i2 variables, MFN_i1 denotes MFN tariffs below median and MFN_i2 denotes MFN 
tariffs above the median value in year t.  
(b)  Recp : Sum of reciprocal preferences extended by partner c on all products except z at time t.  
Recp_i1 to Recp_i4 are year-wise quartiles of reciprocity variable.  In case of regressions with 
reciprocity without any quarters, Recp_i1 denotes reciprocity variable. Similarly, in case of 
regressions with Recp_i1 and Recp_i2 variables, Recp_i1 denotes reciprocity below median and 
Recp_i2 denotes reciprocity above the median value in year t.  
(c)  GSP: is a dummy variable i.e. GSP = 1 if product z gets GSP benefit in the EU market at time t . 
GSP =0 if product z is not covered under the GSP program of the EU at time t . 
iii)  We use simple average of applied ad valorem tariffs for all products at six digit level. For the products with 
specific duties, we calculate ad-valorem equivalents as given in WITS by using the NAMA methodology. 
iv)  The figures reported in the top-panel of the table are estimated coefficients. The standard errors (se) are in 
the brackets and are clustered at product level. The significant t-values are marked by asterisks at acceptable level of 
significance.  
v)  Constant:  Stata fits a model, in which the Dz (i.e. individual specific fixed effects) are taken as deviations 
from one constant term, displayed as _cons. 
vi)  R
2 (within) is reported in the fourth last row. Stata command xtreg, fe obtains its estimates by performing 
OLS on transformed model, so the R
2 reported do not have all the properties of the OLS  R
2.  
vii)  rho values estimate that 16.9% to 21.4% of variation in preferential tariff (i.e. dependent variable , PRF ) is 
due to the product specific differences Dz . 
viii)  F (n-1, N-n-k):  F- test provides a test of the null hypothesis Ho that all Dz =0 . In other words, we wish to 
test whether the individual specific heterogeneity of Dz is necessary i.e. are there distinguishable intercept terms 
across units?  A rejection of this Ho indicates that pooled OLS would produce inconsistent estimates. 
ix)  F (k, N-n-k):  F-statistics to test the null Ho that the coefficients on the regressors (dependent variables) are 
jointly zero i.e. whether our model is overall significant. A rejection of Ho implies that our model is overall 
significant. The F-statistic in all the cases shows high significance level for our model as a tool to explain the 
important ingredients of preferential tariff formation of the EU. 
  33 
Table 2  
The Determinants of the EU’s Preferential Tariff 
 
 All  Partners   
(1995-2007) 
All Partners  
(1995-2007) 
All Partners  
(1995-2007) 
All Partners  
(1995-2007) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PRF#  FE FE FE FE 
MFN_af_i1  0.182 0.170 0.179 0.180 
  (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) 






  (0.079) (0.078) (0.080) (0.080) 






  (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060) 
      
MFN_af_i4  -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 






  (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
      
MFN_na_i2  -0.001 0.024 0.025 0.019 
  (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) 
      
MFN_na_i3 -0.068
* -0.038 -0.039 -0.026 
  (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) 






  (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
      
Recp_i1     -0.012  0.060 
     (0.033)  (0.060) 
      
Recp_i2     -0.003  -0.039 
     (0.009)  (0.038) 
      
Recp_i3      0.133
*** 
      (0.038) 
      
Recp_i4      -0.008 
      (0.011) 
      




    (0.098) (0.096) (0.096) 






  (0.324) (0.397) (0.404) (0.416) 
N  65148 65148 65023 65023 
n  5102 5102 5102 5102 
k  26 27 30 34 
Product FE  No Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Period  1998 to 2007  1998 to 2007  1998 to 2007  1998 to 2007 
F (k, N-n-k) 171.315 162.171 148.654 133.449 
rho  0.174 0.172 0.187 0.187 
r2_w  0.131 0.135 0.134 0.134 
Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the product level. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001, N= number of observations, n= number of groups, k= number of dependent variables. 34 
Note: 
i)  # PRF (the dependent variable , zt PRF ): Simple average of preferential tariffs applied by the EU on all of its 
partners trading on preferential basis at six digit HS 1996 product z at time t .   
ii)  The dependent variable (PRF) is regressed on  
(a)  MFN: Simple average of MFN applied tariff by the EU on product z at time t on six digit HS 1996 
classification.  MFN_af_i1 to MFN_af_i4 are year-wise quartiles of MFN tariffs on agricultural 
products. MFN_na_i1 to MFN_na_i4 are year-wise quartiles of MFN tariffs on industrial 
products.   
(b)  Recp: Sum of reciprocal preferences extended by partner c on all products except z at time t.  
Recp_i1 to Recp_i4 are year-wise quartiles of reciprocity variable.  In case of regressions with 
reciprocity without any quarters, Recp_i1 denotes reciprocity variable. Similarly, in case of 
regressions with Recp_i1 and Recp_i2 variables, Recp_i1 denotes reciprocity below the median 
and Recp_i2 denotes reciprocity above the median value in year t.  
(c)  GSP: is a dummy variable i.e. GSP =1 if product z gets GSP benefit given by EU to any partner at 
time t . GSP =0 if product z is not covered under the GSP program of EU at time t . 
iii)  We use simple average of applied ad valorem tariffs for all products at six digit level. For the products with 
specific duties, we calculate ad-valorem equivalents as given in WITS by using the NAMA methodology. 
iv)  The figures reported in the top-panel of the table are estimated coefficients. The standard errors (se) are in 
the brackets and are clustered at product level. The significant t-values are marked by asterisks at acceptable level of 
significance.  
v)  Constant: Stata fits a model, in which the Dz (i.e. individual specific fixed effects) are taken as deviations 
from one constant term, displayed as _cons. 
vi)  R
2 (within) is reported in the fourth last row. Stata command xtreg, fe obtains its estimates by performing 
OLS on transformed model, so the R
2 reported do not have all the properties of the OLS R
2.  
vii)  rho values estimate that 17.2% to 18.7% of variation in preferential tariff (i.e. dependent variable , PRF ) is 
due to the product specific differences Dz . 
viii)  F (n-1, N-n-k):  F- test provides a test of the null hypothesis Ho that  all Dz =0 . In other words, we wish to 
test whether the individual specific heterogeneity of Dz is necessary i.e. are there distinguishable intercept terms 
across units?  A rejection of this Ho indicates that pooled OLS would produce inconsistent estimates. 
ix)  F (k, N-n-k):  F-statistics to test the null Ho that the coefficients on the regressors (dependent variables) are 
jointly zero i.e. whether our model is overall significant. A rejection of Ho implies that our model is overall 
significant. The F-statistic in all the cases shows high significance level for our model as a tool to explain the 




























  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 









  (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
         






      (0.007) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
         





       (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
          





       (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
         
Recp_i1 -0.032
*** -0.002 0.037
***    0.030
** 0.017 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.011)      (0.011) (0.020) 
         
Recp_i2     -0.019
*    -0.020
* 0.063
*** 
     (0.008)    (0.008)  (0.017) 
         
Recp_i3         0.021
* 
         (0.010) 
         
Recp_i4         -0.028
* 
         (0.011) 
         
gsp -0.070
* -0.018 -0.006    -0.028 -0.024 -0.023 
  (0.032) (0.025) (0.026)    (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) 









  (0.091) (0.075) (0.083) (0.089) (0.095) (0.091) (0.088) 
N  48474 48474 48474 49904 49904 48474 48474 
n    5080 5080 5084 5084 5080 5080 
k  12 12 16 16 17 20 24 
Product FE  No  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time  FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period  1998 to 2007  1998 to 2007  1998 to 2007 1998 to 2007 1998 to 2007 1998 to 2007  1998 to 2007
F (k, N-n-k) 246.487 268.301 206.787 222.666 214.718 197.431 164.969 
rho    0.473 0.415 0.332 0.332 0.354 0.354 
r2_a 0.081        
r2_w    0.105 0.109 0.101 0.101 0.116 0.116 
Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the product level. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
N= number of observations, n= number of groups, k= number of dependent variables. 
Note: 
i)  # PRF (the dependent variable , zt PRF ): Simple average of preferential tariffs applied by the EU on all of its 
partners trading on preferential basis at six digit HS 1996 product z at time t.   
ii)  The dependent variable (PRF) is regressed on  
(d)  MFN: Simple average of MFN applied tariff by the EU on product z at time t on six digit HS 1996 
classification.  MFN_i1 to MFN_i4 are year-wise quartiles of MFN tariffs.  In case of regressions 
only with MFN, MFN_i1 denotes MFN variable. Similarly, in case of regressions with MFN_i1 36 
and MFN_i2 variables, MFN_i1 denotes MFN tariffs below median and MFN_i2 denotes MFN 
tariffs above the median value in year t.  
(e)  Recp : Sum of reciprocal preferences extended by partner c on all products except z at time t.  
Recp_i1 to Recp_i4 are year-wise quartiles of reciprocity variable.  In case of regressions with 
reciprocity without any quarters, Recp_i1 denotes reciprocity variable. Similarly, in case of 
regressions with Recp_i1 and Recp_i2 variables, Recp_i1 denotes reciprocity below median and 
Recp_i2 denotes reciprocity above the median value in year t.  
(f)  GSP: is a dummy variable i.e. GSP = 1 if product z gets GSP benefit in the EU market at time t . 
GSP =0 if product z is not covered under the GSP program of the EU at time t . 
iii)  We use simple average of applied ad valorem tariffs for all products at six digit level. For the products with 
specific duties, we calculate ad-valorem equivalents as given in WITS by using the NAMA methodology. 
iv)  The figures reported in the top-panel of the table are estimated coefficients. The standard errors (se) are in 
the brackets and are clustered at product level. The significant t-values are marked by asterisks at acceptable level of 
significance.  
v)  Constant:  Stata fits a model, in which the Dz (i.e. individual specific fixed effects) are taken as deviations 
from one constant term, displayed as _cons. 
vi)  R
2 (within) is reported in the fourth last row. Stata command xtreg, fe obtains its estimates by performing 
OLS on transformed model, so the R
2 reported do not have all the properties of the OLS  R
2.  
vii)  rho values estimate that 33.2% to 47.3% of variation in preferential tariff (i.e. dependent variable , PRF ) is 
due to the product specific differences Dz . 
viii)  F (n-1, N-n-k):  F- test provides a test of the null hypothesis Ho that all Dz =0 . In other words, we wish to 
test whether the individual specific heterogeneity of Dz is necessary i.e. are there distinguishable intercept terms 
across units?  A rejection of this Ho indicates that pooled OLS would produce inconsistent estimates. 
ix)  F (k, N-n-k):  F-statistics to test the null Ho that the coefficients on the regressors (dependent variables) are 
jointly zero i.e. whether our model is overall significant. A rejection of Ho implies that our model is overall 
significant. The F-statistic in all the cases shows high significance level for our model as a tool to explain the 
important ingredients of preferential tariff formation of the EU.  37 
Table 4 
The Determinants of EU's Preferential Tariff (DCs 1998-2007) 
 












  (1) (2) (3) (4) 






  (0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.046) 
      
MFN_af_i2 0.177
* 0.176
* 0.158 0.158 
  (0.082) (0.082) (0.085) (0.085) 
      
MFN_af_i3  -0.059 -0.059 -0.057 -0.058 
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.037) (0.037) 






  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 






  (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 






  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 






  (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) 
      
MFN_na_i4 -0.037  -0.038  -0.054
** -0.053
** 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
      
Recp_i1     0.009  0.019 
     (0.006)  (0.019) 
      
Recp_i2     0.024  0.057
*** 
     (0.014)  (0.016) 
      
Recp_i3      0.018 
      (0.010) 
      
Recp_i4      -0.028
* 
      (0.011) 
      
gsp    -0.031 -0.029 -0.027 
    (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 






  (0.091) (0.098) (0.098) (0.091) 
N  49904 49904 48474 48474 
n  5084 5084 5080 5080 
k  23 24 27 31 
Product FE  No Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Period  1998 to 2007  1998 to 2007  1998 to 2007  1998 to 2007 
F (k, N-n-k) 540.049 520.786 439.314 388.854 
rho  0.332 0.331 0.357 0.356 
r2_w  0.106 0.106 0.124 0.124 
Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the product level.               
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001  
N= number of observations, n= number of groups, k= number of dependent variables. 38 
Note: 
i)  # PRF (the dependent variable , zt PRF ): Simple average of preferential tariffs applied by the EU on all of its 
partners trading on preferential basis at six digit HS 1996 product z at time t .   
ii)  The dependent variable (PRF) is regressed on  
(d)  MFN: Simple average of MFN applied tariff by the EU on product z at time t on six digit HS 1996 
classification.  MFN_af_i1 to MFN_af_i4 are year-wise quartiles of MFN tariffs on agricultural 
products. MFN_na_i1 to MFN_na_i4 are year-wise quartiles of MFN tariffs on industrial 
products.   
(e)  Recp: Sum of reciprocal preferences extended by partner c on all products except z at time t.  
Recp_i1 to Recp_i4 are year-wise quartiles of reciprocity variable.  In case of regressions with 
reciprocity without any quarters, Recp_i1 denotes reciprocity variable. Similarly, in case of 
regressions with Recp_i1 and Recp_i2 variables, Recp_i1 denotes reciprocity below the median 
and Recp_i2 denotes reciprocity above the median value in year t.  
(f)  GSP: is a dummy variable i.e. GSP =1 if product z gets GSP benefit given by EU to any partner at 
time t . GSP =0 if product z is not covered under the GSP program of EU at time t . 
iii)  We use simple average of applied ad valorem tariffs for all products at six digit level. For the products with 
specific duties, we calculate ad-valorem equivalents as given in WITS by using the NAMA methodology. 
iv)  The figures reported in the top-panel of the table are estimated coefficients. The standard errors (se) are in 
the brackets and are clustered at product level. The significant t-values are marked by asterisks at acceptable level of 
significance.  
v)  Constant: Stata fits a model, in which the Dz (i.e. individual specific fixed effects) are taken as deviations 
from one constant term, displayed as _cons. 
vi)  R
2 (within) is reported in the fourth last row. Stata command xtreg, fe obtains its estimates by performing 
OLS on transformed model, so the R
2 reported do not have all the properties of the OLS R
2.  
vii)  rho values estimate that 33.1 to 35.7% of variation in preferential tariff (i.e. dependent variable , PRF ) is 
due to the product specific differences Dz . 
viii)  F (n-1, N-n-k):  F- test provides a test of the null hypothesis Ho that all Dz =0 . In other words, we wish to 
test whether the individual specific heterogeneity of Dz is necessary i.e. are there distinguishable intercept terms 
across units?  A rejection of this Ho indicates that pooled OLS would produce inconsistent estimates. 
ix)  F (k, N-n-k):  F-statistics to test the null Ho that the coefficients on the regressors (dependent variables) are 
jointly zero i.e. whether our model is overall significant. A rejection of Ho implies that our model is overall 
significant. The F-statistic in all the cases shows high significance level for our model as a tool to explain the 





















Typology of the EU's regional agreements, May 2004 
 
 
Type of trade regime  Name of agreement  Countries involved 
Single market  European Economic Area 
(EEA) 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway 
Customs union    Turkey, Andorra, San Marino 
Free-trade area    Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Faroe 
Islands, FYROM, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, 
Mexico, Morocco, Palestinian 
Authority, Romania, South 
Africa, Switzerland, Tunisia 
Partnership and cooperation 
agreements (MFN treatment) 
  Russia and other former 






African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries, Algeria, Egypt, Syria 
Non-reciprocal: autonomous 
preferences 
Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP), and 
Stabilization and Association 
Agreements. 
Other developing countries and 
members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent 
States  
Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Serbia and 
Montenegro (including 
Kosovo) 
Purely MFN treatment    Australia; Canada; Chinese 
Taipei; Hong Kong, China; 
Japan; Republic of Korea; New 
Zealand; Singapore;  and the 
United States. 
Source:  WTO Secretariat based on Lamy, P. (2002), Stepping stones or stumbling blocks? The EC's 
approach towards the problem of multilateralism and regionalism in trade policy. The World Economy, 











2004 2006 2006 
bound rate 
U.R. 
1.   Bound tariff lines (% of all tariff lines)  100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
2.   Duty-free tariff lines (% of all tariff lines)  26.9 26.0 25.2  25.2
3.   Non-ad valorem tariffs (% of all tariff 
lines) 
9.9 10.0 10.0 10.0
4.   Tariff quotas (% of all tariff lines)  3.3 3.4 3.4  3.4
5.   Non-ad valorem tariffs with no AVEs  
(% of all tariff lines) 
2.7 2.1 2.1 2.1
6.   Simple average tariff rate  6.5 6.9 7.0  7.0
 Agricultural products (WTO definition)
a 
 Non-agricultural products (WTO definition)
b 
16.5 18.6 18.6 18.6
4.1 4.0 4.1 4.1
7    Domestic tariff "spikes" (% of all tariff 
lines)
c 
5.8 5.6 5.8 5.8
8.   International tariff "peaks" (% of all tariff 
lines)
d 
8.6 9.0 9.3 9.3
9.   Overall standard deviation of applied 
rates 
11.5 14.0 14.0 14.0
10. "Nuisance" applied rates (% of all tariff 
lines)
e 
6.8 9.4 9.4 9.4
 
a  WTO Agreement on Agriculture definitions. 
b Excluding  petroleum. 
c  Domestic tariff spikes are defined as those exceeding three times the overall simple average applied rate   
              (indicator 6). 
d  International tariff peaks are defined as those exceeding 15%. 
e  Nuisance rates are those greater than zero, but less than or equal to 2%. 
Note:  The 2006 bound tariff rate is the "conventional" rate given by the EU, while the UR rate is the final bound  
              rate extracted from the WTO database. 
 















Structure of the EU MFN tariff by WTO sector, 2006 
 
 
  All products: HS 01-97  WTO Agriculture  WTO non-agriculture* 
  Number of lines  %  Number of lines %  Number of lines % 
Total 9,843  100.0 2,059 100.0 7,784 100.0
Ad valorem  8,854  90.0 1,107 53.8 7,747 99.5
   Duty free  2,559  26.0 389 18.9 2,170 27.9
   Dutiable  6,295  64.0 718 34.9 5,577 71.6
Non-ad valorem  989  10.0 952 46.2 37 0.5
   Spécific  633  6.4 628 30.5 5 0.1
   Mixed  73  0.7 42 2.0 31 0.4
   Compound  197  2.0 197 9.6 0 0.0
   Other  86  0.9 85 4.1 1 0.0
* Includes petroleum.   
 




Summary Analysis of the EU Applied MFN tariffs, 2006 












(%)  CV  
Total 9,843 9,741 6.9 0-427.9  14.0  2.0
By WTO definition
b               
Agriculture 2,059 1,957 18.6 0-427.9  27.1  1.5
Live animals and products 
thereof 
331 295 27.3 0-427.9 39.9  1.5
Dairy products  155 123 42.4 1.6-134.4  28.8  0.7
Coffee and  tea, cocoa, sugar, 
etc. 
300 294 18.8 0-163.8 19.7  1.0
Cut flowers and plants  62 62 4.3 0-19.2  4.4  1.0
Fruit and vegetables  437 437 16.2 0-300.8  22.1  1.4
Grains 55 55 55.2 0-116.6  33.4  0.6
Oil seeds, fats, oils and their 
products 
164 162 7.4 0-137.2 16.3  2.2
Beverages and spirits  272 253 15.2 0-209.8  22.7  1.5
Tobacco 30 30 19.7 5.2-74.9  20.8  1.1
Other agricultural products  253 246 6.1 0-122  14.7  2.4
Non-agriculture (excl. 
petroleum) 
7,743 7,743 4.0 0-35.6 4.1  1.0
Fish and fishery products  381 381 10.5 0-26  6.6  0.6
Mineral products, precious 
stones and precious metals 
513 513 2.4 0-13.8 2.9  1.2
Metals 1,024 1,024 1.8 0-10  2.3  1.3
Chemicals and photographic 
supplies 
1,389 1,389 4.4 0-35.6 2.8  0.6
Leather, rubber, footwear and 
travel goods 
283 283 4.8 0-17 4.7  1.0
Wood, pulp, paper and 
furniture 
444 444 1.2 0-10 2.3  2.0
Textiles and clothing  1,269 1,269 8.0 0-12  3.2  0.4
Transport equipment  262 262 4.8 0-22  5.1  1.1
Non-electric machinery  952 952 1.7 0-9.7  1.4  0.8
Electric machinery  544 544 2.8 0-14  3.4  1.2
Non agricultural articles n.e.s.  682 682 2.4 0-14  1.9  0.8
a  Tariff rates are based on a lower frequency (number of lines) since lines with no ad valorem equivalents are 
excluded. 
b  Some 41 tariff lines are excluded from both WTO agriculture and non-agriculture definitions (petroleum 
products). 
Note:  CV = coefficient of variation. 








MFN and Preferential Tariff Averages
a, 2006 
 
  All 
products 
HS  WTO product groups 
01-24 25-97 Agriculture Non-
agriculture 
MFN 6.9 18.0 3.7 18.5  4.0
GSP
a 4.8 15.8 1.6 16.7  1.8
Syria 3.9 17.3 0.1 17.6  0.5
Gaza Strip  3.9 17.2 0.0 17.5  0.5
Faeroe Islands  3.9 17.2 0.0 18.0  0.4
Egypt 3.9 17.0 0.1 17.3  0.5
Israel 3.8 16.9 0.0 17.2  0.5
Liechtenstein 3.8 16.6 0.1 18.0  0.2
Norway 3.7 16.0 0.1 17.5  0.2
Iceland 3.7 16.0 0.1 17.5  0.2
Switzerland 3.5 15.4 0.1 15.4  0.5
Algeria 3.3 14.4 0.1 16.4  0.0
Tunisia 3.3 14.3 0.0 16.2  0.0
Chile 3.2 13.9 0.1 15.1  0.2
Morocco 3.2 14.0 0.0 15.8  0.0
Mexico 3.1 13.5 0.1 14.9  0.2
South Africa  3.1 13.2 0.1 13.0  0.6
GSP+
b 2.6 11.4 0.1 13.0  0.0
Turkey 2.4 10.7 0.0 12.1  0.0
ACP
c 2.2 9.7 0.0 11.1  0.0
Romania 1.9 8.2 0.0 8.8  0.1
Bulgaria 1.8 7.7 0.0 8.8  0.0
Albania 0.5 2.0 0.0 1.8  0.1
Bosnia Herzegovina  0.5 2.0 0.0 1.8  0.1
Serbia   0.5 2.0 0.0 1.8  0.1
Montenegro 0.5 2.0 0.0 1.8  0.1
FYR of Macedonia  0.3 1.5 0.0 1.6  0.0
Lebanon 0.3 1.3 0.0 1.6  0.0
LDCs
d 0.3 1.2 0.0 1.3  0.0
Croatia 0.3 1.2 0.0 1.1  0.1
OCT
e 0.3 1.1 0.0 1.3  0.0
Jordan 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.4  0.0
Andorra 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3  0.0
San Marino  0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1  0.0
 
a  The table shows the simple average applied tariff rates, calculated across all tariff lines, for each 
arrangement (reciprocal and non-reciprocal) of the EU;  thus, if a particular arrangement has a mix of both 
preferential and MFN rates, the average across all applicable rates is taken.  In the case of tariff quotas, out-of-quota 
tariff rates are used.  Certain countries fall under several groupings depending on the number of schemes they are 
eligible for under the EU's preferential regime. 
b  Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Anguilla, Argentina, Armenia, Netherlands Antilles, Antarctica, American 
Samoa, Aruba, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bermuda, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bouvet Island, Botswana, 45 
Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Chile, China, Christmas Islands, Cocos Islands (or Keeling Islands), Cook 
Islands, Congo, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Federated States of Micronesia, Falkland Islands, 
Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Gibraltar, Greenland, Grenada, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, Guam, Guyana, 
Heard Island and McDonald Islands, India, Indonesia, British Indian Ocean Territory, Iran, Iraq, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Cayman Islands, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Macao, Northern 
Mariana Islands, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Montserrat, Morocco, Namibia, Nauru, New Caledonia, Norfolk 
Island, Nigeria, Niue Island, Oman, French Polynesia, Pakistan, St Pierre and Miquelon, Pitcairn, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Marshall Islands, Russia, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent, 
Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Senegal, Saint Helena, South Africa, Surinam, Swaziland, Turks and Caicos Islands, 
French Southern Territories, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United States Minor Outlying Islands, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Virgin 
Islands (British), Virgin Islands (USA), Vietnam, Wallis and Futuna,, Mayotte, and Zimbabwe. 
c  Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela. 
d  Antigua and Barbuda, Angola, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Federation of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nauru, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Cape Verde, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, St Christopher and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, 
Vanuatu, Western Samoa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
e  Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nepal, Republic of Cape Verde, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon 
Islands, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Western Samoa, 
Yemen, and Zambia. 
f  Overseas Countries and Territories: Aruba, The Netherlands Antilles (Bonaire, Curacao, St Martin, Saba, 
St Eustatius), New Caledonia and dependencies, Wallis and Futuna Islands, French Polynesia, French Southern and 
Arctic Territories, Mayotte, St Pierre and Miquelon, Anguilla, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands and dependencies, 
Turks and Caicos Islands, Montserrat, Pitcairn, St Helena and dependencies, British Antarctic Territories, British 
Indian Ocean Territories, Greenland, South Geórgia, South Sandwich Islands, and British Virgin Islands. 
Source:  WTO Secretariat calculations.  
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   Annex VI 
 
The EU’s Preferential Tariff Regime 






1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains
H0 H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H2 H2 H2 H2 H2 H3 
1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
000  World  5019 5113 5113 5113 5113 5113 5113 5224 5224 5224 5224 5224 5052
4  Afghanistan  76 4498 4461 4449 4873 4802 4177 4240 4239 3900 3909 3925 3725
8  Albania  591 4246 4233 3814 4819 4619 3804 4246 4245 3853 3904 3913 3716
12  Algeria  452 4764 4819 4803 4885 4866 3804 4126 4127 3781 3788 3805 3602
16 American 
Samoa 
 4311 4233 3814 4819 4619 3804 3986 3986 3638 3646 3697 3499
20  Andorra    652 5111 5113 4249 4263 3879 3933 3949 3740
24  Angola  178 4916 4892 4949 5003 5010 4177 4257 4256 3916 3926 3942 3740
660  Anguila  11 4311 4233 3814 4819 4619 3804 4264 4263 3917 3933 3945 3736
28 Antigua  and 
Barbuda 
80 4911 4888 4945 5003 4970 3804 4209 4173 3861 3845 3890 3683
32  Argentina  1278 4311 4233 3814 4819 4619 3804 3822 3950 3638 3646 3697 3499
51  Armenia  49 4208 4233 3814 4819 4619 3804 3859 3867 3638 3588 3697 3499
533  Aruba  67 4311 4233 3814 4819 4619 3804 4264 4263 3917 3933 3945 3736
31  Azerbaijan  80 4208 4233 3814 4819 4619 3804 3859 3867 3638 3588 3697 3499
44 Bahamas, 
The 
226 4911 4888 4945 5003 4970 3804 4209 4173 3861 3845 3890 3683
48  Bahrain  531 4311 4233 3814 4819 4619 3804 3986 3986 3638 3646 3697 3499
50  Bangladesh  560 4498 4461 4449 4873 4802 4177 4240 4239 3900 3909 3925 3725
52  Barbados  173 4911 4890 4945 5003 4970 3804 4209 4173 3861 3845 3890 3683
112  Belarus  893 4208 4233 3814 4819 4619 3804 3840 3848 3638 3588 3697 3499
84  Belize  70 4911 4890 4945 5003 4970 3804 4209 4173 3861 3845 3890 3683
…  …  …  …  …  … … … … … … …  …  … …





1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains
H0 H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H2 H2 H2 H2 H2 H3 
1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
…  …  …  …  …  … … … … … … …  …  … …
862  Venezuela  643 4311 4233 3814 4819 4710 3804 4049 4182 3706 3720 3726 3526
704  Vietnam  817 4311 4233 3814 4819 4619 3804 3986 3986 3638 3646 3697 3499
872 Wake  Island    4311  4233 3814 4819 4619 3804 3986 3986   3646 
876 Wallis  and 
Futura Isl. 
14 4311 4233 3814 4819 4619 3804 4264 4263 3917 3933 3945 3736
732 Western 
Sahara 
 652  70 685    
887  Yemen  137 4498 4461 4449 4873 4802 4177 4240 4239 3900 3909 3925 3725
891 Yugoslavia    652  70 690 4236    
894  Zambia  158 4916 4894 4949 5003 5010 4177 4257 4256 3916 3926 3942 3740
716  Zimbabwe  604 4911 4890 4945 5003 4970 3804 4209 4173 3861 3845 3890 3683
Notes:  
1.     The total preferential trading partners of the EU are 218, but here we are illustrating only few partners to 
keep the Annexure short, otherwise this information runs into 15 pages. For transparency, the complete list can be 
obtained on request by sending an email to me at vivek.joshi@gradutateinstite.ch   
2.    The numbers mentioned in column 3 to column 15 are the year-wise number of products on six digit HS, 
getting preferential access to the EU market for the country listed in column 2.  
3.      The HS classification on which the raw data is available is mentioned on the top row of the table header.  
H0, H1, H2 and H3 denote HS1988/1992, HS2002 and HS2007 respectively.  
4.       The number of products on which MFN tariff is applied is mentioned in the first row of the table, with the 
row heading ‘World’.  
5.       We have year-wise excel-sheets for each country for preferential tariff and one excel-sheet for the EU’s 
MFN applied tariff.  
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MFN     Trains   IDB  Trains Trains IDB   Trains  IDB  Trains
P R F                  
World 
Imp 
  CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT 
EU 
Imp 





MFN     Trains Trains   Trains Trains Trains  Trains  Trains Trains
PRF               Trains  Trains Trains
World 
Imp 
  CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT 
EU 
Imp 
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CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT 
5  Chile* 01 02 
2003 
MFN  Trains  IDB  Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains IDB  Trains Trains Trains Trains
PRF                T r a i n s T r a i n s
World 
Imp 
Trains  IDB  CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT 
EU 
Imp 





M F N         Trains IDB IDB Trains Trains Trains Trains
PRF          Trains   Trains Trains Trains Trains
World 
Imp 
    CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT 
EU 
Imp 
    CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT 
7  Egypt* 01 06 
2004 
MFN  Trains   IDB  Trains IDB IDB IDB Trains IDB  Trains Trains   Trains







Data    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
World 
Imp 















8  Israel* 01 06 
2000 
MFN      IDB  IDB  IDB  IDB  IDB  Trains Trains Trains Trains
P R F         I D B       Trains Trains Trains Trains
World 
Imp 
  CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT Trains
EU 
Imp 





M F N        Trains Trains Trains Trains IDB  Trains Trains Trains
P R F               Trains    
World 
Imp  
      CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT 
EU 
Imp 





M F N        Trains Trains Trains   Trains Trains Trains Trains
P R F                  
World 
Imp 
    CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT 
EU 
Imp 





MFN  Trains   Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains  
PRF            Trains  Trains  Trains  
World 
Imp 
Trains  CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT 
EU 
Imp 





MFN     Trains   Trains Trains Trains Trains  Trains  Trains Trains
PRF               Trains  Trains Trains
World 
Imp 
  Trains   Trains Trains CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT 
EU 
Imp 
     CMT
# CMT





MFN   Trains Trains   Trains IDB  Trains IDB IDB Trains Trains Trains Trains
PRF         IDB  Trains IDB IDB Trains Trains Trains Trains
World 
Imp 
  Trains  CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT CMT Trains
EU 
Imp 





MFN   Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains
PRF     Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains Trains
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Notes :  
1.    *: We get preferential tariff data by codifying the legal text of the EU- partner Agreement. Source: WTO 
Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS) http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx  
(Eleven partners) 
2.   
# : We get Imports from EU by Norway (1995), Egypt (1996-2007), Morocco(2000-2001), South Africa 
(1995, 1996), Tunisia(1998-1999) and Turkey(1995), using the mirror exports by EU to these country-years. 
Exports data is on FOB (free on board) basis and imports data is on CIF (Cost insurance and freight) basis, so we 
have to make adjustments for this difference. FOB figures are approximately 5% to 10 % lower than the 
corresponding CIF figures. We take 6% to adjust the FOB values to CIF values. (Six partners). 
3.     PTAs with Andorra (CU), Bosina Herzegovina, Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT), Faroe Islands, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Palestinian Authority, San Marino, Syria : We do not have even the basic minimum data to 
codify the text of these agreements, moreover, these PTAs are too small to make an impact on our estimations. We 
drop these countries from our analysis. (Nine partners) 
4.      Cotonou Partners: The Lome IV Agreement (1990-2000) and Cotonou Agreement (2000-2007) are non-
reciprocal; hence we do not require data on the preferential tariffs extended by ACP countries to EU products. 
Hence, we drop the following ACP countries from our analysis: 
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bosina Herzegovina, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Comoros, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Seychelles, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzaina, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uganda, Zimbabwe. (Thirty five partners) 
5.      For three partners namely, South Africa, Switzerland and Turkey; the full data on MFN and preferential 
tariff is available on WITS.  















, zt PRF   Equation 
(5) to (7) 
Simple average of ad-valorem 
preferential tariffs applied by the 
EU on import of six digit HS 1996 
product z from ‘PRF region’ at time 
t. 
Trains Refer  Annex VI for details on 
EU’s preferential tariff data 
availability.  
, zt MFN   Equation 
(5) to (7) 
Simple average of MFN applied 
tariff by the EU on imports of six 
digit HS 1996 product z from rest 







  Imports of product z from the EU 




Refer Annex VII for available 






  Total imports of product z by 




Refer Annex VII for available 
data on total imports.  
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zt MFN     MFN tariff applied by partner k on 
HS 1996 product z at time t. 
Trains 
/ IDB 
Refer Annex VII for data 




zt PRF  
  Preferential tariff applied by 
partner k on EU HS 1996 product z 
at time t. 
Trains/ 
IDB 
Refer Annex VII for details on 







  Margin of preference or mop     ,
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zt zt mop s 
 
  Reciprocity offered by partner k to 
the EU on product z at time t.  
  
q    Number of partners that are 
extending preferential access to the 
EU on product z at time t.   
  
, zt Recp  
 
Equation 
(5) to (7) 
The sum of reciprocal preferences 
extended by partner k on all 

















(5) to (7) 
A dummy variable that is equal to 
one if the product z gets GSP 
benefit in EU market at time t 
otherwise it is equal to zero. 
Trains  
, 1zt i   Equation  
(6), (7) 
An indicator variable that is equal 
to one, if MFN tariff falls in the 
first quarter of MFN tariff applied 
by the EU on all products at time t, 
otherwise it is equal to zero.  
  For equation (6), we have one 
cut-off point. Hence,  , 1z t i is 
equal to one, if MFNz,t is 
smaller than the cut-off value 
of 7.0%, otherwise it is equal to 
zero.  
, 2zt i   Equation  
(6), (7) 
An indicator variable that is equal 
to one, if MFN tariff falls in the 
second quarter of MFN tariff 
applied by the EU on all products at 
time t, otherwise it is equal to zero. 
  For equation (6), we have one 
cut-off point. Hence,  , 2z t i is 
equal to one if MFNz,t is greater 
than the cut-off value of 7.0%, 













Equation   
(7) 
An indicator variable that is equal 
to one, if MFN tariff falls in the 
third quarter of MFN tariff applied 
by the EU on all products at time t, 






An indicator variable that is equal 
to one, if MFN tariff falls in the 
fourth quarter of MFN tariff 
applied by the EU on all products at 
time t, otherwise it is equal to zero. 
  
, 1zt ir   Equation  
(6), (7) 
An indicator variable that is equal 
to one, if reciprocity by the ‘PRF 
region’ on product z at time t is in 
the first quarter of reciprocity on 
the same product at time t, 
otherwise it is equal to zero.   
  For equation (6), we have one 
cut-off point. Hence,  , 1z t ir is 
equal to one, if Recpz,t is lower 
than the cut-off 4.06, otherwise 
it is equal to zero.  
, 2z t ir   Equation  
(6), (7) 
An indicator variable that is equal 
to one, if reciprocity by the ‘PRF 
region’ on product z at time t is in 
the second quarter of reciprocity on 
the same product at time t, 
otherwise it is equal to zero.   
  For equation (6), we have one 
cut-off point. Hence, 
, 2z t ir is 
equal to one, is Recpz,t is higher 
than the cut-off value of 4.06, 





An indicator variable that is equal 
to one, if reciprocity by the ‘PRF 
region’ on product z at time t is in 
the third quarter of reciprocity on 
the same product at time t, 






An indicator variable that is equal 
to one, if reciprocity by the ‘PRF 
region’ on product z at time t is in 
the fourth quarter of reciprocity on 
the same product at time t, 




World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) has been developed by the World Bank, in 
collaboration with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  It 
accesses and retrieves information on trade and tariffs which is compiled by the following 
international organizations: 
Trains : The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Trade 
Analysis Information System (TRAINS) that contains information on Imports, Tariffs, Para-
Tariffs and Non-Tariff Measures for 119 countries. The data on tariffs, para-tariffs and non-tariff 
measures are available at the most detailed commodity level of the national tariffs (i.e., at the 
tariff line level). The data are recorded according to three internationally recognized trade and 
tariff classifications. 
Comtrade:  The United Nation Statistical Division (UNSD) Commodity Trade 
(COMTRADE) Data Base that contains Exports and Imports by Commodity and Partner 53 
Country. Values are recorded in US Dollars along with a variety of quantity measures. The Data 
Base includes information for over 130 countries, some of which have been reporting these types 
of statistics to the United Nations since 1962.The data are recorded according to six 
internationally recognized trade and tariff classifications. 
IDB/CTS, WTO : The World Trade Organization (WTO) Integrated Data Base (IDB) that 
contain Imports by Commodity and Partner Country and MFN Applied Tariffs for over 80 
countries at the most detailed commodity level of the national tariffs; and, the Consolidated 
Tariff Schedule Data Base (CTS) that contains WTO Bound Tariffs, Initial Negotiating Rights 








Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
year  66547 2001 3.74 1995 2007
hs1 66547  549263.60 272681.30 010111  980600
PRFz,t  65699 1.29 5.84 0  466.12
MFNz,t  65148 6.10 20.01 0  1570.51
MFN_i1 65148  0.75 1.20 0  3.8
MFN_i2 65148  1.37 2.41 0  7
MFN_i3 65148  2.00 4.12 0  14
MFN_i4 65148  1.97 20.08 0  1570.51
MFN_i1_m 65148  2.12 2.27 0  7
MFN_i2_m 65148  3.98 20.30 0  1570.51
Recpz,t 65982  -3.07 4.78 -706.29  0
Recp_i1 65982  -0.50 0.72 -2.30  0
Recp_i2 65982  -0.78 1.37 -4.06  0
Recp_i3 65982  -1.10 2.24 -8.16  0
Recp_i4 65982  -0.70 4.72 -706.29  0
Recp_i1_m 65982  -1.27 1.27 -4.06  0
Recp_i2_m 65982  -1.79 5.08 -706.29  0
GSPz,t  66547 0.82 0.39 0  1
 
 